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Field Notes

Preparing for the C-Suite Means Learning to Check Yourself

Executives preparing for a C-suite role try to close the gaps in what they know. The larger change is that nobody above them can check their work any more.

7 min readNovember 2026

The expert above eventually disappears

Preparing for a C-suite role usually starts with a list of gaps. The technologist names finance, the finance director names customers, the sales head names the board. The plan follows the list: an executive programme, a few board presentations, an invitation to the strategy offsite. No part of it is wrong, and none of it touches the real change.

A net that was always there

For most of a career, an executive reports to someone who knows their field better than they do. Above the young engineer is a senior engineer, and above the director is the head of the discipline. That person checks the substance of the work: the error in the calculation, the weakness in the architecture, the gap in the contract. Most executives never notice the net, because it has always been there.

In the C-suite the net is gone. When a technology director becomes chief technology officer, they report to the chief executive, and the chief executive does not know technology as well as they do; that is why they were hired. The person who would have caught the mistake first disappears overnight, and nobody takes their place. In the C-suite there is nobody above who can check the substance of the work, and that gap is what preparation is really about.

When the check goes, one of two habits sets in

Looking for approval in the wrong place

A pattern we meet often in coaching begins with a group company's technology director promoted to chief technology officer. For years they reported to the group's head of technology and took every major architecture decision to that person first. In the first months of the new role, they carry the habit over to the chief executive: each significant decision is explained, approved, then executed. The chief executive listens, asks a few questions and agrees.

Nothing looks wrong. But the chief executive's approval is no longer a check; what is being weighed is not the technical substance of the decision but whether the person presenting it seems sure. The executive, out of habit, carries that approval as though it were verification. A year later, when an infrastructure decision comes back with a cost nobody expected, both of them notice the same thing: nobody had checked it.

Taking silence for agreement

The other habit is the reverse, and it is quieter. Because nobody objects, the executive starts to assume their decisions are right. The team reports to them and finds it hard to push back, peers run other functions and stay out of theirs, and the chief executive is not an expert. Errors grow in that setting, because the first pair of eyes that would have caught them is missing. When the expert above leaves, being wrong does not get easier; noticing it gets harder.

The two habits look like opposites but come from the same place. In both, the executive assumes the check still lives somewhere outside them: with the chief executive, or in a room that does not object. It is usually the last lesson of the first year.

The chief executive's approval is not a check; it weighs the confidence of the person presenting, not the substance of the decision.

Preparation moves the check inside before the title arrives

A candidate who knows the check is going can move it into their own way of working before the title arrives. This is not a training programme; it is a change of habit that can be made in the current role, while the expert above is still there. With the candidates we work with, three practices do most of the work:

  • writing down, before a decision, its reasoning and what would prove it wrong, in two or three sentences
  • finding a peer outside the hierarchy who knows the field and will not hesitate to disagree
  • trying to explain a decision to someone outside the field, in terms they could decide on

Reasoning on paper

The first is the simplest and the most often skipped. Before a major decision, the candidate writes three things on a page: what they are deciding, why, and what sign would make them accept they were wrong. A few months later they go back to the page. It is the closest substitute for the expert above, because it tests the decision against its reasoning at the time rather than against hindsight. Written reasoning is the only record against which an executive can check themselves once nobody else can.

In the first weeks the pages usually show the same thing: the third line is left blank, or filled with something like if the expected result does not come, which rules nothing out. That is not a writing problem; it is a finding. An executive who cannot say which sign would show them wrong will not recognise the sign when it arrives. As the line gets concrete, a named cost exceeded in a named quarter, the page stops being a diary and becomes a test.

Having the expert above read these pages while they are still there is the most valuable part of the preparation. The expert does less to judge the decision than to show where the reasoning is thin, and the candidate learns to read their own reasoning with that eye. When the title comes, the eye is no longer outside them. It is on the page.

Disagreement from outside the hierarchy

The second practice puts a source of disagreement where the silence would be. It cannot be someone on the team, because the team reports to the executive, and it cannot be the chief executive, who is not an expert. It might be a peer in the same seat at another company, a respected former executive in the field, or a member of an advisory board. What matters is that they know enough to understand the decision and owe the executive nothing. Left until after the title, it usually comes too late, because a new C-suite executive is least willing to be seen wrong in that first period.

The chief executive sees the reasoning, not the expertise

The third practice changes the visible side of the job. The chief executive and the board cannot audit the executive's field, but they do assess their judgment, from one place: how a decision is explained. A detailed technical account shows expertise but does not help anyone decide. An account that is too simple hides the risk and turns approval into an empty gesture.

The board makes this sharper. It meets a few times a year, its agenda is crowded, and it knows the executive almost entirely through their presentations. Depth of expertise is invisible there; what is visible is how plainly the risk in a decision is stated. A board's confidence grows less from the decisions that went well than from the ones whose way of going badly was named in advance.

Saying what would prove it wrong

With the chief technology officer in the pattern, we tried explaining every major decision to the chief executive in two sentences: what they proposed, and under what condition it would turn out wrong. The second sentence was hard for the first few weeks, because years of explaining to an expert had never required it; the expert would have supplied it. Once it settled, the chief executive's questions changed. They stopped asking about technical detail and started asking about the assumption, and approval became a real assessment for the first time. Explaining a decision well in the C-suite means handing the listener the condition that would prove it wrong.

This is close to being the last stop, as described in our piece on how general managers are made, but it is not the same. The general manager is the last stop for decisions between functions. The C-suite head of a function is the last stop on the substance of their own field, and has to explain that substance to a table that does not know it. We have written that preparation starts before the title. Here too it starts with this rehearsal, while the expert above is still in the room.

From the field

The subject usually enters the room as a list of gaps. The candidate asks which field to learn and which programme to take before moving into the C-suite. We ask something else: who would check their last major decision today, and who will check it a year from now, when that person is no longer above them. The question is not asked to throw out the list of gaps, only to put it in the right order.

What happens in the room

The first answer comes quickly, because the expert above has a name. The second is usually met with a pause. The candidate names the chief executive, then the team, and notices for themselves that neither can do the job. From there the conversation turns from the list of gaps to where the check will live. Preparing for the C-suite means moving the expert's eye onto one's own page before the expert leaves.

How we work begins with that question. Our other pieces sit on the Perspective page.

For senior executives preparing for a C-suite role

Let's talk first about who will check your decisions, not the list of gaps.

The first conversation starts not with a training plan but with writing down, together, the reasoning behind your last major decision.

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2026 · Vol I